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Abstract
A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions re-
quired to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time
memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a
classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is
complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not
exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings.
Here, we propose a scheme for using quantum information, together with the assumption of
stateless (i.e., reusable) hardware tokens, to build statistically secure OTMs. Via the semidefinite
programming-based quantum games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [STOC 2007], we
prove security for a malicious receiver, against a linear number of adaptive queries to the token,
in the quantum universal composability framework. We prove stand-alone security against
a malicious sender, but leave open the question of composable security against a malicious
sender, as well as security against a malicious receiver making a polynomial number of adaptive
queries. Compared to alternative schemes derived from the literature on quantum money, our
scheme is technologically simple since it is of the “prepare-and-measure” type. We also show
our scheme is “tight” according to two scenarios.
1 Introduction
The study of theoretical cryptography is centered around the question of building cryptographic
primitives secure against adversarial attacks. In order to allow a broader set of such primitives to be
implemented, one often considers restricting the power of the adversary. For example, one can limit
the computing power of adversaries to be polynomial bounded [Yao82, BM82], restrict the storage
of adversaries to be bounded or noisy [Mau92, CM97, DFSS05], or make trusted setups available
to honest players [Kil88, BFM88, Can01, CLOS02, IPS08, PR08, LPV09, MPR09, MPR10, MR11,
KMQ11, KMPS14], to name a few. One well-known trusted setup is tamper-proof hardware [Kat07,
GKR08], which is assumed to provide a specific input-output functionality, and which can only be
accessed in a “black box” fashion. The hardware can maintain a state (i.e., is stateful) and possibly
carry out complex functionality, but presumably may be difficult or expensive to implement or
manufacture. This leads to an interesting research direction: Building cryptography primitives
using the simplest (and hence easiest and cheapest to manufacture) hardware.
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In this respect, two distinct simplified notions of hardware have captured considerable interest.
The first is the notion of a one-time memory (OTM) [GKR08], which is arguably the simplest possible
notion of stateful hardware. An OTM, modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer,
behaves as follows: first, a player (called the sender) embeds two values s0 and s1 into the OTM,
and then gives the OTM to another player (called the receiver). The receiver can now read his choice
of precisely one of s0 or s1; after this “use” of the OTM, however, the unread bit is lost forever.
Interestingly, OTMs are complete for implementing one-time use programs (OTPs): given access
to OTMs, one can implement statistically secure OTPs for any efficiently computable program
in the universal composability (UC) framework [GIS+10]. (OTPs, in turn, have applications in
software protection and one-time proofs [GKR08].) In the quantum UC model, OTMs enable
quantum one-time programs [BGS13]. (This situation is analogous to the case of oblivious transfer
being complete for two-party secure function evaluation [Kil88, IPS08].) Unfortunately, OTMs are
inherently stateful, and thus represent a very strong cryptographic assumption — any physical
implementation of such a device must somehow maintain internal knowledge between activations,
i.e., it must completely “self-destruct” after a single use.
This brings us to a second important simplified notion of hardware known as a stateless to-
ken [CGS08], which keeps no record of previous interactions. On the positive side, such hardware
is presumably easier to implement. On the negative side, an adversary can run an experiment with
stateless hardware as many times as desired, and each time the hardware is essentially “reset”.
(Despite this, stateless hardware has been useful in achieving computationally secure multi-party
computation [CGS08, GIS+10, CKS+14], and statistically secure commitments [DS13].) It thus seems
impossible for stateless tokens to be helpful in implementing any sort of “self-destruct” mechanism.
Indeed, classically stateful tokens are trivially more powerful than stateless ones, as observed in,
e.g., [GIS+10]. This raises the question:
Can quantum information, together with a classical stateless token, be used to simulate “self
destruction” of a hardware token?
In particular, a natural question along these lines is whether quantum information can help
implement an OTM. Unfortunately, it is known that quantum information alone cannot implement
an OTM (or, more generally, any one-time program) [BGS13]; see also Section 4 below. We thus ask
the question: What are the minimal cryptographic assumptions required in a quantum world to
implement an OTM?
Contributions and summary of techniques. Our main contribution is to propose a prepare-and-
measure quantum protocol that constructs OTMs from stateless hardware tokens. We provide a
proof which establishes information theoretic security against an adversary making a linear (in n,
the security parameter) number of adaptive queries to the token. Even in this setting of linear
queries, this result is in sharp contrast to the classical case, in which such a construction is trivially
impossible. We also show stand-alone security against a malicious sender.
HISTORICAL NOTE. A preliminary version of this work [BGZ15] claimed security against a poly-
nomial number of token queries. This was claimed via a reduction from the interactive to the
non-interactive setting. We thank an anonymous referee for catching a subtle, but important bug
in that proof attempt. For clarity, our current proof against a linear number of queries uses a
different approach. Since our original paper was posted, recent related work [CGLZ18] has shown
a quantum transformation from stateful to stateless tokens, directly using constructions and proofs
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from the literature on quantum money [BDS18]. As far as we are aware, this family of schemes
requires highly entangled states that do not satisfy the requirements of a prepare-and-measure
scheme. This recent work also raises a concern about our security model involving an honest
sender; this concern is addressed in Section 3.2 where we show stand-alone security against a
malicious sender.
CONSTRUCTION. Our construction is inspired by Wiesner’s idea for conjugate coding [Wie83]: the
quantum portion of the protocols consists in n quantum states chosen uniformly at random from
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} (note this encoding is independent of the classical bits of the OTM functionality).
We then couple this n-qubit quantum state, |ψ〉 (sometimes called the quantum key) with a classical
stateless hardware token, which takes as inputs a choice bit b, together with an n-bit string y. If
b = 0, the hardware token verifies that the bits of y that correspond to rectilinear (|0〉 or |1〉, i.e.,
Z basis) encoded qubits of |ψ〉 are consistent with the measurement of |ψ〉 in the computational
basis, in which case the bit s0 is returned. If b = 1, the hardware token verifies that the bits of y
that correspond to diagonal (|+〉 or |−〉, i.e., X basis) encoded qubits of |ψ〉 are consistent with the
measurement of |ψ〉 in the diagonal basis, in which case the bit s1 is returned.
ASSUMPTION. Crucially, the hardware token is specified to accept classical input only1 (i.e., it cannot
be queried in superposition). Although this may seem a strong assumption, in Section 4.1 we
show that any token which can be queried in superposition in a reversible way, cannot be used
to construct a secure OTM (with respect to our setting in which the adversary is allowed to apply
arbitrary quantum operations). Similar classical-input hardware has previously been considered in,
e.g., [Unr13, BGS13].
SECURITY AND INTUITION. Stand-alone security against a malicious sender is relatively straight-
forward to establish, since the protocol consists in a single message from the sender to the receiver,
and since stand-alone security only requires simulation of the local view of the adversary.
The intuition underlying security against a malicious receiver is clear: in order for a receiver to
extract a bit sb as encoded in the OTM, she must perform a complete measurement of the qubits
of |ψ〉 in order to obtain a classical key for sb (since, otherwise, she would likely fail the test as
imposed by the hardware token). But such a measurement would invalidate the receiver’s chance
of extracting the bit s1−b! This is exactly the “self-destruct”-like property we require in order to
implement an OTM. This intuitive notion of security was already present in Wiesner’s proposal
for quantum money2 [Wie83], and is often given a physical explanation in terms of the no-cloning
theorem [WZ82], or the Heisenberg uncertainty relation [Hei27].
Formally, we work in the statistical (i.e., information-theoretic) setting of the quantum Universal
Composability (UC) framework [Unr10], which allows us to make strong security statements that
address the composability of our protocol within others. As a proof technique, we describe a
simulator, such that for any “quantum environment” wishing to interact with the OTM, the
environment statistically cannot tell whether it is interacting with the ideal OTM functionality or the
real OTM instance provided by our scheme. The security of this simulator requires a statement of
the following form: Given access to a (randomly chosen) “quantum key” |ψk〉 and corresponding
stateless token Vk, it is highly unlikely for an adversary to successfully extract keys for both the secret
bits s0 and s1 held by Vk. We are able to show this statement for any adversary which makes a linear
number of queries, by which we mean an adversary making m queries succeeds with probability at
1This can be simulated on quantum inputs by having the token immediately measure its input in the standard basis.
2Intuitively, quantum money aims to construct a physical currency which is impossible to counterfeit by the laws of
quantum mechanics.
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most O(22m−0.228n) (for n the number of quantum key bits in |ψk〉). In other words, if the adversary
makes at most m = cn queries with c < 0.114, then its probability of cheating successfully is
exponentially small in n. To show this statement, we exploit the semidefinite programming-based
quantum games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] to model interaction with the token.
We describe this technique in Section 3.4 and provide the full details in the Appendix C.
Summarizing, we show the following.
Main Theorem (informal). There exists a protocol Π, which together with a classical stateless token and
the ability to randomly prepare single qubits in one of four pure states, implements the OTM functionality
with statistical security in the UC framework against a corrupted receiver making a linear number of adaptive
queries.
We leave open the question of security against a polynomial number of adaptive queries.
Further Related work. Our work contributes to the growing list of functionalities achievable
with quantum information, yet unachievable classically. This includes: unconditionally secure
key expansion [BB84], physically uncloneable money [Wie83, MVW13, PYJ+12], a reduction from
oblivious transfer to bit commitment [BBCS92, DFL+09] and to other primitives such as “cut-
and choose” functionality [FKS+13], and revocable time-release quantum encryption [Unr14].
Importantly, these protocols all make use of the technique of conjugate coding [Wie83], which is
also an important technique used in protocols for OT in the bounded quantum storage and noisy
quantum storage models [DFSS05, WST08] (see [BS16] for a survey).
A number of proof techniques have been developed in the context of conjugate coding, including
entropic uncertainty relations [WW10]. In the context of QKD, another successful technique is
the use of de Finetti reductions [Ren08] (which exploit the symmetry of the scheme in order
to simplify the analysis). Recently, semidefinite programming approaches have been applied
to analyze security of conjugate coding [MVW13]. This is the type of approach we adopt for
our proof (Section 3.4 and Appendix C), though here we work with the more general quantum
games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [GW07]. Reference [PYJ+12] has also made use of
Gavinsky’s [Gav12] quantum retrieval games framework.
Continuing with proof techniques, somewhat similar to [PYJ+12], Aaronson and Christiano [AC12]
have studied quantum money schemes in which one interacts with a verifier. They introduce an
“inner product adversary method” to lower bound the number of queries required to break their
scheme.
We remark that [PYJ+12] and [MVW13] have studied schemes based on conjugate coding
similar to ours, but in the context of quantum money. In contrast to our setting, the schemes
of [PYJ+12] and [MVW13] (for example) involve dynamically chosen random challenges from a
verifier to the holder of a “quantum banknote”, whereas in our work here the “challenges” are
fixed (i.e., measure all qubits in the Z or X basis to obtain secret bit s0 or s1, respectively), and the
verifier is replaced by a stateless token.
Also, we note that prior work has achieved oblivious transfer using quantum information, to-
gether with some assumption (e.g., bit commitment [BBCS92] or bounded quantum storage [DFSS05]).
These protocols typically use an interaction phase similar to the “commit-and-open” protocol
of [BBCS92]; because we are working in the non-interactive setting, these techniques appear to be
inapplicable.
Finally, Liu [Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15] has given stand-alone secure OTMs using quantum in-
formation. In contrast to our setting, in which we allow unbounded and unrestricted quantum
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adversaries, Liu’s results are set in the isolated-qubit model, which assumes that an adversary can
perform only single-qubit operations (no entangling gates are permitted). However, in exchange
for restricting the adversary, Liu is able to avoid the use of trusted setups. The security notion of
OTMs by Liu is weaker than the simulation-based notion that is studied in this paper, and it is
unclear whether this type of OTM is composable.
Significance. Our results show a strong separation between the classical and quantum settings,
since classically, stateless tokens cannot be used to securely implement OTMs. To the best of
our knowledge, our work is the first to combine conjugate coding with stateless hardware tokens.
Moreover, while our protocol shares similarities with prior work in the setting of quantum money,
building OTMs appears to be a new focus here 3.
Our protocol has a simple implementation, fitting into the single-qubit prepare-and-measure
paradigm (one needs only the ability to prepares states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉). In addition, from a
theoretical cryptographic perspective, our protocol is attractive in that its implementation requires
an assumption of a stateless hardware token, which is conceivably easier and cheaper to mass
produce than a stateful token.
In terms of security guarantees, we allow arbitrary operations on behalf of a malicious quantum
receiver in our protocol (i.e., all operations allowed by quantum mechanics), with the adversary
restricted in that the stateless token is assumed only usable as a black box. The security we obtain
is statistical, with the only computational assumption being on the number of queries made to the
token. Finally, our proofs are rigorous statements in the quantum UC framework, meaning our
protocol can be easily composed with others proved secure in this framework (e.g., combining our
results with [BGS13]’s protocol immediately yields UC-secure quantum OTPs against a dishonest
receiver).
We close by remarking that our scheme is “tight” with respect to two impossibility results, both
of which assume the adversary has black-box access to both the token and its inverse operation 4.
First, the assumption that the token be queried only in the computational basis cannot be relaxed:
Section 4.1 shows that if the token can be queried in superposition, then an adversary in our setting
can easily break any OTM scheme. Second, our scheme has the property that corresponding to
each secret bit si held by the token, there are exponentially many valid keys one can input to the
token to extract si. In Section 4.2, we show that for any “measure-and-access” OTM (i.e., an OTM in
which one measures a given quantum key and uses the classical measurement result to access a
token to extract data, of which our protocol is an example), a polynomial number of keys implies
the ability to break the scheme with inverse polynomial probability (more generally, ∆ keys allows
probability at least 1/∆2 of breaking the scheme).
Open Questions. While our work shows the fundamental advantage quantum information yields
in a stateful to stateless reduction, it does leave a number of open questions:
1. Security against polynomially many queries. Can our security proof be strengthened to
show information theoretic security against a polynomial number of queries to the token?
We conjecture this to be the case, but finding a formal proof has been elusive.
3We remark, however, that a reminiscent concept of single usage of quantum “tickets” in the context of quantum
money is very briefly mentioned in Appendix S.4.1 of [PYJ+12].
4This is common in quantum computation, where a function f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1} is typically implemented via a
unitary U f acting on n + 1 qubits, and satisfying U f |x〉|y〉 = |x〉|y⊕ f (x)〉. By definition, U f is self-inverse; thus, a user
with access to U f trivially also has access to its inverse U†f = U f .
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2. Composable security against a malicious sender. While we show composable security
against a malicious receiver, our protocol can achieve standalone security against a malicious
sender. Could an adaptation of our protocol ensure composable security against a malicious
sender as well?
3. Non-reversible token. Our impossibility result for quantum one-time memories with quan-
tum queries (Section 4) assumes the adversary has access to reversible tokens; can a similar
impossibility result be shown for non-reversible tokens?
4. Imperfect devices. While our prepare-and-measure scheme is technologically simple, it is
still virtually unrealizable with current technology, due to the requirement of perfect quantum
measurements. We leave open the question of tolerance to a small amount of noise.
Acknowledgements. We thank anonymous referees for pointing out that the impossibility result
against quantum queries applies only if we model the token as a reversible process, as well as for
finding an error in a prior version of this work, which erroneously claimed a reduction from the
adaptive to non-adaptive case. We thank Jamie Sikora for related discussions. This material is
based upon work supported by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number
FA9550-17-1-0083, Canadas NSERC, an Ontario ERA, and the University of Ottawas Research
Chairs program.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in
Section 2 with preliminaries, including the ideal functionalities for an OTM and stateless token.
In Section 3, we give our construction for an OTM based on a stateless hardware token; the proof
ideas for security are also provided. In Section 4, we discuss “tightness” of our construction by
showing two impossibility results for “relaxations” of our scheme. In the Appendix, we include
the description of classical UC and quantum UC (Appendix A); Appendix B establishes notation
required in the definition of stand-alone security against a malicious sender. Appendix C gives
our formal security proof against a linear number of queries to the token; these results are used to
finish the security proof in Section 3.) In addition, the security proof for a lemma in Section 4 can
be found in Appendix D.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We say two binary distributions X and Y are indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y, if it
holds that |Pr(Xn = 1)− Pr(Yn = 1)| ≤ negl(n). We define single-qubit |0〉+ = |0〉 and |1〉+ = |1〉,
so that {|0〉+, |1〉+} form the rectilinear basis. We also define |0〉× = 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉) and |1〉× =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), so that {|0〉×, |1〉×} form the diagonal basis. For strings x = x1, x2, . . . xn ∈ {0, 1}n and
θ = θ1, θ2, . . . , θn ∈ {+,×}n, we define |x〉θ = ⊗ni=1 |xi〉θi . Finally, H denotes the standard 2× 2
Hadamard gate H = (1 1; 1 − 1)/√2 in quantum information.
Quantum universal composition (UC) framework. We consider simulation-based security in this
paper. In particular, we prove the security of our construction against a malicious receiver in
the quantum universal composition (UC) framework [Unr10]. Please see Appendix A for a brief
description of the classical UC [Can01] and the quantum UC [Unr10]. In the next two paragraphs,
we introduce two relevant ideal functionalities of one-time memory and of stateless hardware
token.
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One-time memory (OTM). The one-time memory (OTM) functionality FOTM involves two parties,
the sender and the receiver, and consists of two phases, “Create” and “Execute”. Please see Func-
tionality 1 below for details; for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the session/party identifiers
as they should be implicitly clear from the context. We sometimes refer to this functionality FOTM as
an OTM token.
Functionality 1 Ideal functionality FOTM.
1. Create: Upon input (s0, s1) from the sender, with s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}, send create to the receiver
and store (s0, s1).
2. Execute: Upon input b ∈ {0, 1} from the receiver, send sb to receiver. Delete any trace of this
instance.
Stateless hardware. The original work of Katz [Kat07] introduces the ideal functionality Fwrap to
model stateful tokens in the UC-framework. In the ideal model, a party that wants to create a token,
sends the Turing machine to Fwrap. Fwrap will then run the machine (keeping the state), when the
designated party will ask for it. The same functionality can be adapted to model stateless tokens. It
is sufficient that the functionality does not keep the state between two executions. A simplified
version of the Fwrap functionality as shown in [CGS08] (that is very similar to the Fwrap of [Kat07])
is described below. Note that, again for the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the session/party
identifiers as they should be implicitly clear from the context.
Although the environment and adversary are unbounded, we specify that stateless hardware
can be queried only a polynomial number of times. This is necessary, since otherwise the hardware
token model is vacuous (with unbounded queries, the entire input-output behavior of stateless
hardware can be deduced, hence there is nothing left to hide).
Functionality 2 Ideal functionality Fwrap.
The functionality is parameterized by a polynomial p(·), and an implicit security parameter n.
1. Create: Upon input (create, M) from the sender, where M is a Turing machine, send create to
the receiver and store M.
2. Execute: Upon input (run, msg) from the receiver, execute M(msg) for at most p(n) steps,
and let out be the response. Let out := ⊥ if M does not halt in p(n) steps. Send out to the
receiver.
3 Feasibility of Quantum OTMs using Stateless Hardware
In this section, we present a quantum construction for one-time memories by using stateless
hardware (Section 3.1). We also state our main theorem (Theorem 3.3). In Section 3.3, we describe
the Simulator and prove Theorem 3.3 using the technical results of Appendix C. The intuition and
techniques behind the proofs in Appendix C are sketched in Section 3.4.
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3.1 Construction
We now present the OTM protocol Π in the Fwrap hybrid model, between a sender Ps and a
receiver Pr. Here the security parameter is n.
Upon receiving input (s0, s1) from the environment where s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}, sender Ps operates as
follows:
• The sender chooses uniformly random strings x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n, and
prepares |x〉θ . Then the sender, based on tuple (s0, s1, x, θ), prepares the program M as in
Program 1.
Program 1 Program for hardware token
Hardcoded values: s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}, x ∈ {0, 1}n, and θ ∈ {+,×}n
Inputs: y ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1}, where y is a claimed measured value for the quantum register,
and b the evaluator’s choice bit
1. If b = 0, check that the θ = + positions return the correct bits in y according to x. If Accept,
output s0. Otherwise output ⊥.
2. If b = 1, check that the θ = × positions return the correct bits in y according to x. If Accept,
output s1. Otherwise output ⊥.
• The sender sends |x〉θ to the receiver.
• The sender sends (create, M) to functionality Fwrap, and the functionality sends create to
notify the receiver.
The receiver Pr operates as follows:
Upon input b from the environment, and |x〉θ from the receiver, and create notification from
Fwrap,
• If b = 0, measure |x〉θ in the computational basis to get string y and input (run, (y, b)) into
Fwrap.
• If b = 1, apply H⊗n to |x〉θ , then measure in the computational basis to get string y and
input (run, (y, b)) into Fwrap.
Return the output of Fwrap to the environment.
It is easy to see that the output of Fwrap is sb for both b = 0 and b = 1.
Note again that the hardware token, as defined in Program 1, accepts only classical input (i.e.,
it cannot be queried in superposition). As mentioned earlier, relaxing this assumption yields
impossibility of a secure OTM implementation (assuming the receiver also has access to the token’s
inverse operation), as shown in Section 4.
3.2 Stand-Alone Security Against a Malicious Sender
We note that in protocol Π of Section 3.1, once the sender prepares and sends the token, she is no
longer involved (and in particular, the sender does not receive any further communication from the
receiver). We call such a protocol a one-way protocol. Because of this simple structure, and because
the ideal functionality Fwrap also does not return any message to the sender, we can easily establish
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stand-alone security against a malicious sender (see Theorem 3.2). Note that this rules out a trivial
construction that is pointed out in [CGLZ18].
In order to define stand-alone security against a malicious sender (Definition 3.1), in our context,
we closely follow definitions given in prior work [DNS10]. Please see Appendix B for details. Note
that, instead of considering the approximate case for security, we are able to use the exact one.
Definition 3.1. An n-step quantum two-party protocol with oracle calls, ΠO = (A ,B,O, n) is statisti-
cally stand-alone secure against a corrupt A if for every adversary ˜A there exists a simulator S such that
for every input ρin,
TrBn⊗R( ˜A ©∗ B) = TrBn⊗R(S ©∗ B) . (1)
We note that Definition 3.1 is weaker than some other definitions for active security used in the
literature, e.g., [DNS12], because we ask only that the local view of the adversary be simulated.
Given the simple structure of our protocol and ideal functionality, the construction and proof of
the simulator is straightforward as shown below.
Theorem 3.2. Protocol Π is statistically stand-alone secure against a corrupt sender.
Proof. Since Π consists in a single message from the sender to the receiver (together with a call
to the ideal functionality for the token), we have that A = (A1). Furthermore, since the ideal
functionality Fwrap does not return anything to the sender, there is no need for our simulator S to
call an ideal functionality.
We thus build S that runs A on the input in register A0. When A calls the Fwrap ideal
functionality, the simulator does nothing. Since Π is a one-way protocol, and since the ideal
functionality also does not allow communication from the receiver to the sender,
TrBn⊗R( ˜A ©∗ B) = A (TrB0⊗R(ρin)) = S(TrB0⊗R(ρin)) . (2)
This concludes the proof.
3.3 UC-Security against a corrupt receiver
Our main theorem, which establishes security against a corrupt receiver is now stated as follows.
Theorem 3.3. Construction Π above quantum-UC-realizes FOTM in the Fwrap hybrid model with statistical
security against an actively-corrupted receiver making at most cn number of adaptive queries to the token,
for any fixed constant c < 0.114.
To prove Theorem 3.3, we must construct and analyze an appropriate simulator, which we now
proceed to do.
3.3.1 The simulator
In order to prove Theorem 3.3, for an adversary A that corrupts the receiver, we need to build a
simulator S (having access to the OTM functionality FOTM), such that for any unbounded environ-
ment Z , the executions in the real model and that in simulation are statistically indistinguishable.
Our simulator S is given below:
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The simulator emulates an internal copy of the adversary A who corrupts the receiver. The sim-
ulator emulates the communication between A and the external environment Z by forwarding
the communication messages between A and Z .
The simulator S needs to emulate the whole view for the adversary A. First, the simulator
picks dummy inputs s˜0 = 0 and s˜1 = 0, and randomly chooses x ∈ {0, 1}n, and θ ∈ {+,×}n,
and generates program M˜. Then the simulator plays the role of the sender to send |x〉θ to
the adversary A (who controls the corrupted receiver). The simulator also emulates Fwrap to
notify A by sending create to indicate that the hardware is ready for queries.
For each query (run, (b, y)) to Fwrap from the adversary A, the simulator evaluates program M˜
(that is created based on s˜0, s˜1, x, θ) as in the construction, and then acts as follows:
1. If this is a rejecting input, output ⊥.
2. If this is the first accepting input, call the external FOTM with input b, and learn the output
sb from FOTM. Output sb.
3. If this is a subsequent accepting input, output sb (as above).
3.3.2 Analysis
We now show that the simulation and the real model execution are statistically indistinguishable.
There are two cases in an execution of the simulation which we must consider:
Case 1: In all its queries to Fwrap, the accepting inputs of A have the same choice bit b. In this case, the
simulation is perfectly indistinguishable.
Case 2: In its queries to Fwrap, A produces accepting inputs for both b = 0 and b = 1. In this case, it
is possible that the simulation fails (the environment can distinguish the real model from the
ideal model), since the simulator is only able to retrieve a single bit from the external OTM
functionality FOTM (either corresponding to b = 0 or b = 1).
Thus, whereas in Case 1 the simulator behaves perfectly, in Case 2 it is in trouble. Fortunately, in
Theorem 3.4 we show that the probability that Case 2 occurs is exponentially small in n, the number
of qubits comprising |x〉θ , provided the number of queries to the token scales as cn for a sufficiently
small fixed constant c > 0. Specifically, we show that for an arbitrary m-query strategy (i.e., any
quantum strategy allowed by quantum mechanics, whether efficiently implementable or not, which
queries the token at most m times), the probability of Case 2 occurring is at most O(22m−0.228n).
(The constant c above thus needs to be chosen as c < 0.114.) This concludes the proof.
3.4 Security analysis for the token: Intuition
Our simulation proof showing statistical security of our Quantum OTM construction of Section 3.1
relies crucially on Theorem 3.4, stated below. As the proof of this theorem uses quantum information
theoretic and semidefinite programming techniques (as opposed to cryptographic techniques), let
us introduce notation in line with the formal analysis of Appendix C.
With respect to the construction of Section 3.1, let us replace each two-tuple (x, θ) ∈ {0, 1}n ×
{+,×}n by a single string z ∈ {0, 1}2n, which we denote the secret key. Bits 2i and 2i+ 1 of z specify
the basis and value of conjugate coding qubit i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (i.e., z2i = θi and z2i+1 = xi). Also,
rename the “quantum key” (or conjugate coding key) |ψz〉 := |x〉θ ∈ (C2)⊗n. Thus, the protocol
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begins by having the sender pick a secret key z ∈ {0, 1}2n uniformly at random, and preparing a
joint state
|ψ〉 = 1
2n ∑z∈|0,1〉2n
|ψz〉R|z〉T.
The first register, R, is sent to the receiver, while the second register, T, is kept by the token. (Thus,
the token knows the secret key z, and hence also which |ψz〉 the receiver possesses.) The mixed
state describing the receiver’s state of knowledge at this point is given by
ρR :=
1
22n ∑
z∈{0,1}2n
|ψz〉〈ψz|.
We can now state Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 3.4. Given a single copy of ρR, and the ability to make m (adaptive) queries to the hardware token,
the probability that an unbounded quantum adversary can force the token to output both bits s0 and s1 scales
as O(22m−0.228n).
Thus, the probability of an unbounded adversary (i.e., with the ability to apply the most general
maps allowed in quantum mechanics, trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) maps, which
are not necessarily efficiently implementable) to successfully cheat using m = cn for c < 0.114
queries is exponentially small in the quantum key size, n.
The full proof of Theorem 3.4 is given in Appendix C. Let us now give the intuition behind the
proof approach.
Proof intuition. The challenge in analyzing security is the additional resource the receiver (hence-
forth called the user) is given, the state ρR, which the user may arbitrarily tamper with (in any
manner allowed by quantum mechanics) while making queries to the token.
To prove Theorem 3.4, we model an adversary’s actions as a two-party interaction between the
user and token via the Gutoski-Watrous (GW) theory of quantum games [GW07]. At a high level,
the GW framework can be used to model our setting via Figure 3.4 (reproduced from Appendix C
for completeness), which we now discuss. The bottom “row” of Figure 3.4 depicts the token’s
actions, and the top row the user’s actions. The protocol begins by imagining the token sends initial
state ρ0 = ρR to the user via register X1. The user then applies an arbitrary sequence of TPCP maps
Φi to its private memory (modeled by register Zi in round i), each time sending a query to the
token via register Yi. Given any such query in round i, the token applies its own TPCP map Ψi to
determine how to respond to the query. The action of Ψi is fully determined by Program 1, and
in principle all Ψi are identical since the token is stateless (i.e., the action of the token in round i is
unaffected by previous rounds {1, . . . , i− 1}). (We use the term “in principle” for the following
reason. In practice, the token indeed has all Ψi being identical. To model our security analysis in
the GW framework, which allows quantum interaction, it is convenient to imagine the token keeps
a history of all queries it has seen thus far, which will technically make the Ψi distinct. What the
history allows the token to do is simulate a measurement in the standard basis of any query the
user sends; thus, the user can even send a quantum (i.e., superposition) query, which the token
immediately measures in the standard basis to recover a classical query string. In other words,
we can simulate forcing the user to make classical queries in the GW framework by exploiting the
well-known principle of deferred measurement. Crucially, in our security analysis, the token does
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Figure 1: A general interaction between two quantum parties.
not condition any of its future actions on this query history it maintains; this ensures the token
is stateless in its behavior. See Appendix C for details.) Finally, after receiving the mth query in
register Ym, we imagine the token makes a measurement (not depicted in Figure 3.4) based on the
query responses it returned; if the user managed to extract both bits s0 and s1 via queries, then the
token “accepts”, and otherwise it “rejects”. (Again, here we are assuming the token keeps a history
of all its responses in our security analysis; this is used only for the final measurement to judge
whether the user cheated successfully, and not in the determination of any other action the token
takes.)
With this high-level setup in place, the output of the GW framework is a semidefinite program,
which we denote Γ:
min: p (3)
subject to: Q1  Rm+1 (4)
Rk = Pk ⊗ IYk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1 (5)
TrXk(Pk) = Rk−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1 (6)
R0 = p (7)
Rk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1 (8)
Pk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k−1 ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1 (9)
Above, Q1 encodes the actions of the token. The variable p denotes the “cheating probability” (i.e.,
the probability with which both s0 and s1 are extracted), subject to the constraint that operator Rm+1
encodes a valid “strategy” for the user of the token. The constraints which enforce a valid “strategy”
are given by Equations (5)-(9). These force the tuple (R1, . . . , Rm+1, P1, . . . , Pm+1) to encode a Choi-
Jamiołkowski representation of a quantum strategy [GW07]. Let us briefly discuss the Choi-Jamiołkowski
representation (details in Appendix C) and outline why such a framework might output an SDP.
Recall that in round i of the protocol, the user applies TPCP map Φi. Any TPCP map has a number
of known representations, one of which is the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation [Cho75, Jam72]. An
advantage of the latter is it allows a simple characterization of the trace-preserving and completely
positive properties of Φi via linear and semidefinite constraints, respectively. Reference [GW07]
extends this definition of the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation from a single TPCP map Φi to an
interactive protocol with multiple such maps (Φ1, . . . ,Φm); thus, intuitively one might expect such
interactive strategies to also be characterized by linear and positive semidefinite constraints (i.e. by
an SDP such as Γ).
Intuition for Q1 and an upper bound on p. It remains to give intuition as to how one derives Q1
in Γ, and how an upper bound on the optimal p is obtained. Without loss of generality, one may
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assume that each of the token’s TPCP maps Ψi are given by isometries Ai : Yi ⊗Wi−1 7→ Xi+1 ⊗Wi,
meaning A†i Ai = IYi⊗Wi−1 (due to the Stinespring dilation theorem). (We omit the first isometry
which prepares state ρ0 in our discussion here for simplicity.) Let us denote their sequential
application by a single operator A := Am · · · A1 (note: to make the product well-defined, in
Equation (16) of Appendix C, one uses tensor products with identity matrices appropriately). Then,
the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation of A is given by [GW07]
TrZm(vec(A) vec(A)
†),
where we trace out the token’s private memory register Zm. (The operator vec(·) reshapes matrix A
into a vector; its precise definition is given in Section C, and is not required for our discussion here.)
However, since in our security analysis, we imagine the token also makes a final measurement
via some POVM P = {P0, P1}, whereupon obtaining outcome P1 the token “accepts”, and upon
outcome P0 the token rejects, we require a slightly more complicated setup — Q1 will actually be
defined as [GW07]
Q1 = TrZm(vec(B1) vec(B1)
†),
for B1 := P1A.
The full derivation of Q1 in our setting takes a few steps, and is given in Appendix C. Here, let
us simply state Q1 and give intuition:
Q1 =
1
4n ∑s∈S
|smbsm〉〈smbsm |Xm+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s1bs1〉〈s1bs1 |X2 ⊗(
∑
(x,z)∈Xs
|xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1 ⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1
)
.
Intuitively, each string sibsi ∈ {0, 1}3 encodes the response of the token given the ith query from
the user; hence, the corresponding projectors in Q1 act on spaces X2 through Xm+1. Each string
xi ∈ {0, 1}n+1 denotes the ith query sent from the user to the token, where each xi = biyi in the
notation of Program 1, i.e. bi ∈ {0, 1} is the choice bit for each query. Each such message is passed
via register Yi. The states |ψz〉 and strings z are defined as in the beginning of Section 3.4; recall
z ∈ {0, 1}2n and |ψz〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n denote the secret key and corresponding quantum key, respectively.
Finally, the relation Xs encodes the constraint that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the tuple (xi, z) (i.e. each
message to the token xi and secret key z) is consistent with the response returned by the token, si.
Upper bounding p. To now upper bound p, our approach is to give a feasible solution Rm+1
satisfying the constraints of Γ. Note that giving even a solution which attains p = 1 for all n and
m is non-trivial — such a solution is given in Lemma C.2 of Appendix C.3. Here, we shall give
a solution which attains p ∈ O(22m−0.228n), as claimed in Theorem 3.4 (and formally proven in
Theorem C.3 of Appendix C.3). Namely, we set
Rm+1 =
1
|S| ∑s∈S
|smbsm〉〈smbsm |Xm+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s1bs1〉〈s1bs1 |X2 ⊗ IY1⊗···⊗Ym ⊗
I
2n X1
.
This satisfies constraint (5) of Γ due to the identity term IY1⊗···⊗Ym . The renormalization factor
of (|S| 2n)−1 above ensures that tracing out all Xi registers yields R0 = 1 in constraint (7) of Γ.
We are thus reduced to choosing the minimum p such that constraint (4) is satisfied. Note that
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setting p = 1 will not work for large enough m for this choice of Rm+1. To see why, observe we
have chosen Rm+1 to align with the block-diagonal structure of Q1 on registers X2, . . . ,Xm. Since
registers Y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ym and X1 of Rm+1 are proportional to the identity matrix, it thus suffices to
characterize the largest eigenvalue of Q1, λmax(Q1). This is done by Lemma C.4 of Appendix C.3,
which says
λmax(Q1) =
2
4n
(
1+
1√
2
)n
.
Combining this bound on λmax(Q1) with the parameters of Rm+1 above now yields the desired
claim that p ∈ O(22m−0.228n). We conclude that for m < 0.114n, the probability that a user of the
token successfully cheats and thus that the simulation fails is exponentially small in the key size, n.
4 Impossibility Results
We now discuss “tightness” of our protocol with respect to impossibility results. To begin, it is
easy to argue that OTMs cannot exist in the plain model (i.e., without additional assumptions) in
both the classical and quantum settings: in the classical setting, impossibility holds, since software
can always be copied. Quantumly, this follows by a simple rewinding argument [BGS13]. Here,
we give two simple no-go results for the quantum setting which support the idea that our scheme
is “tight” in terms of the minimality of the assumptions it uses. Both results assume the token is
reversible, meaning the receiver can run both the token and its inverse operation. The results can
be stated as:
1. A stateless token which can be queried in superposition cannot be used to securely construct
an OTM (Section 4.1).
2. For measure and access schemes such as ours, in order for a stateless token to allow statistical
security, it must have an exponential number of keys per secret bit (Section 4.2).
4.1 Impossibility: Tokens which can be queried in superposition
In our construction, we require that all queries to the token be classical strings, i.e., no querying
in superposition is allowed. It is easy to argue via a standard rewinding argument that relaxing
this requirement yields impossibility of a secure OTM, as long as access to the token’s adjoint
(inverse) operation is given, as we now show. Specifically, let M be a quantum OTM implemented
using a hardware token. Since the token access is assumed to be reversible, we may model it as an
oracle O f realizing a function f : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}m in the standard way, i.e., for all y ∈ {0, 1}n and
b ∈ {0, 1}m,
O f |y〉|b〉 = |y〉|b⊕ f (y)〉. (10)
Now, suppose our OTM stores two secret bits s0 and s1, and provides the receiver with an initial
state |ψ〉 ∈ A⊗ B⊗ C, where A, B, and C are the algorithm’s workspace, query (i.e., input to O f ),
and answer (i.e., O f ’s answers) registers, respectively. By definition, an honest receiver must be
able to access precisely one of s0 or s1 with certainty, given |ψ〉. Thus, for any i ∈ {0, 1}, there
exists a quantum query algorithm Ai = UmO f · · ·O f U2O f U1 for unitaries Ui ∈ U (A ⊗ B ⊗ C)
such that Ai|ψ〉 = |ψ′〉AB|si〉C. For any choice of i, however, this implies a malicious receiver can
now classically copy si to an external register, and then “rewind” by applying A†i to |ψ′〉AB|si〉C to
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recover |ψ〉. Applying Ai′ for i′ 6= i to |ψ〉 now yields the second bit i′ with certainty as well. We
conclude that a quantum OTM which allows superposition queries to a reversible stateless token is
insecure.
Remark 4.1. Above, we assumed the OTM outputs si with certainty. The argument can be generalized
to the setting in which the OTM outputs si with probability at least 1− e for small e > 0; in this case,
Winter’s Gentle Measurement Lemma [Win99] can be used to show that both bits can again be recovered
with non-negligible probability.
Remark 4.2. Our argument crucially relies on the fact that the receiver has superposition access to the A†i
operation. In certain models (e.g., software), such access is unavoidable. However, our result does not rule
out the possibility that non-reversible superposition access to a token would allow for quantum OTMs.
4.2 Impossibility: Tokens with a bounded number of keys
We have observed that allowing superposition queries to the token prevents an OTM from being
secure. One might next ask how simple a hardware token with classical queries can be, while still
allowing a secure OTM. We now explore one such strengthening of our construction in which the
token is forced to have a bounded number of keys.
To formalize this, let us define the notion of a “measure-and-access (MA)” OTM, i.e., an OTM in
which given an initial state |ψ〉, an honest receiver applies a prescribed measurement to |ψ〉, and
feeds the resulting classical string (i.e., key) y into the token O f to obtain si. Our construction is
an example of a MA memory in which each bit si has an exponential number of valid keys y such
that f (y) = si. One might ask whether the construction can be strengthened such that each si has a
bounded number (e.g., a polynomial number) of keys. We now show that such a strengthening
would preclude security, assuming the token is reversible.
For clarity, implicitly in our proof below, we model the oracle O f as having three possible
outputs: 0, 1, or 2, where 2 is output whenever O f is fed an invalid key y. This is required for the
notion of having “few” keys to make sense (i.e., there are 2n candidate keys, and only two secret
bits, each of which is supposed to have a bounded number of keys). Note that our construction
indeed fits into this framework.
Lemma 4.3. Let M be an MA memory with oracle O f , such that O f cannot be queried in superposition. If
a secret bit si has at most ∆ keys yi such that f (yi) = si, then given a single copy of |ψ〉, one can extract
both s0 and s1 from M with probability at least 1/∆2.
Remark 4.4. The proof is given in Appendix D. Lemma 4.3 shows that in the paradigm of measure-and-
access memories, our construction is essentially tight — in order to bound the adversary’s success probability
of obtaining both secret bits by an inverse exponential, we require each secret bit to have exponentially many
valid keys. Second, as in the setting of superposition queries, the above proof can be generalized to the setting
in which the OTM returns the correct bit si with probability at least 1− e for small e > 0. Finally, the
question of whether a similar statement to Lemma 4.3 holds for a non-reversible token remains open.
A Universal Composition (UC) Framework
We consider simulation-based security. The Universal Composability (UC) framework was pro-
posed by Canetti [Can01, Can00b], culminating a long sequence of simulation-based security
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definitions (c.f. [GMW87, GL91, MR92, Bea91, Can00a]); please see also [PW01, PS04, CDPW07,
LPV09, MR11] for alternative/extended frameworks. Recently Unruh [Unr10] extend the UC frame-
work to the quantum setting. Next, we provide a high-level description of the original classical UC
model by Canetti [Can01, Can00b], and then the quantum UC model by Unruh [Unr10].
A.1 Classical UC Model ([Can01, Can00b])
Machines. The basic entities involved in the UC model are players P1, . . . , Pk where k is poly-
nomial of security parameter n, an adversary A, and an environment Z . Each entity is modeled
as a interactive Turing machine (ITM), where Z could have an additional non-uniform string as
advice. Each Pi has identity i assigned to it, while A and Z have special identities idA := adv and
idZ := env.
Protocol Execution. A protocol specifies the programs for each Pi, which we denote as pi =
(pi1, . . . ,pik). The execution of a protocol is coordinated by the environmentZ . It starts by preparing
inputs to all players, who then run their respective programs on the inputs and exchange messages
of the form (idsender, idreceiver, msg). A can corrupt an arbitrary set of players and control them
later on. In particular, A can instruct a corrupted player sending messages to another player and
also read messages that are sent to the corrupted players. During the course of execution, the
environment Z also interacts with A in an arbitrary way. In the end, Z receives outputs from all
the other players and generates one bit output. We use EXEC[Z ,A,pi] denote the distribution of
the environment Z ’s (single-bit) output when executing protocol pi with A and the Pi’s.
Ideal Functionality and Dummy Protocol. Ideal functionality F is a trusted party, modeled by
an ITM again, that perfectly implements the desired multi-party computational task. We consider
an “dummy protocol”, denoted PF , where each party has direct communication with F, who
accomplishes the desired task according to the messages received from the players. The execution
of PF with environment Z and an adversary, usually called the simulator S , is defined analogous
as above, in particular, S monitors the communication between corrupted parties and the ideal
functionality F. Similarly, we denote Z ’s output distribution as EXEC[Z ,S , PF ].
Definition A.1 (Classical UC-secure Emulation). We say pi (classically) UC-emulates pi′ if for any
adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for all environments Z ,
EXEC[Z ,A,pi] ≈ EXEC[Z ,S ,pi′] (11)
We here consider that A and Z are computationally unbounded, and we call it statistical UC-security. We
require the running time S is polynomial in that of A. We call this property Polynomial Simulation.
Let F be a well-formed two party functionality. We say pi (classically) UC-realizes F if for
all adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for all environments Z , EXEC[Z ,A,pi] ≈
EXEC[Z ,S , PF ]. We also write EXEC[Z ,A,pi] ≈ EXEC[Z ,S ,F ] if the context is clear.
UC-secure protocols admit a general composition property, demonstrated in the following
universal composition theorem.
Theorem A.2 (UC Composition Theorem [Can00b]). Let pi,pi′ and σ be n-party protocols. Assume that
pi UC-emulates pi′. Then σpi UC-emulates σpi′ .
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A.2 Quantum UC Model ([Unr10])
Now, we give a high-level description of quantum UC model by Unruh [Unr10].
Quantum Machine. In the quantum UC model, all players are modeled as quantum machines.
A quantum machine is a sequence of quantum circuits {Mn}n∈N, for each security parameter n.
Mn is a completely positive trace preserving operator on space Hstate ⊗Hclass ⊗Hquant, where
Hstate represents the internal workspace of Mn and Hclass and Hquant represent the spaces for
communication, where for convenience we divide the messages into classical and quantum parts.
We allow a non-uniform quantum advice5 to the machine of the environment Z , while all other
machines are uniformly generated.
Protocol Execution. In contrast to the communication policy in classical UC model, we consider
a network N which contains the space HN := Hclass ⊗Hquant ⊗i Hstatei . Namely, each machine
maintains individual internal state space, but the communication space is shared among all .
We assume Hclass contains the message (idsender, idreceiver, msg) which specifies the sender and
receiver of the current message, and the receiver then processes the quantum state onHquant. Note
that this communication model implicitly ensures authentication. In a protocol execution, Z is
activated first, and at each round, one player applies the operation defined by its machine Mn
onHclass ⊗Hquant ⊗Hstate. In the end Z generates a one-bit output. Denote EXEC[Z ,A,Π] the
output distribution of Z .
Ideal Functionality. All functionalities we consider in this work are classical, i.e., the inputs and
outputs are classical, and its program can be implemented by an efficient classical Turing machine.
Here in the quantum UC model, the ideal functionality F is still modeled as a quantum machine
for consistency, but it only applies classical operations. Namely, it measures any input message in
the computational basis to get an classical bit-string, and implements the operations specified by
the classical computational task.
We consider an “dummy protocol”, denoted PF , where each party has direct communication
withF, who accomplishes the desired task according to the messages received from the players. The
execution of PF with environment Z and an adversary, usually called the simulator S , is defined
analogous as above, in particular, S monitors the communication between corrupted parties and
the ideal functionality F. Similarly, we denote Z ’s output distribution as EXEC[Z ,S , PF ]. For
simplicity, we also write it as EXEC[Z ,S ,F ].
Definition A.3 (Quantum UC-secure Emulation). We say Π quantum-UC-emulates Π′ if for any
quantum adversary A, there exists a (quantum) simulator S such that for all quantum environments Z ,
EXEC[Z ,A,Π] ≈ EXEC[Z ,S ,Π′] (12)
We consider here thatA and Z are computationally unbounded, we call it (quantum) statistical UC-security.
We require the running time S is polynomial in that of A. We call this property Polynomial Simulation.
5Unruh’s model only allows classical advice, but we tend to take the most general model. It is easy to justify that
almost all results remain unchanged, including the composition theorem. See [HSS11, Section 5] for more discussion.
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Similarly, (quantum) computational UC-security can be defined. Let F be a well-formed two
party functionality. We say Π quantum-UC-realizes F if for all quantum adversary A, there
exists a (quantum) simulator S such that for all quantum environments Z , EXEC[Z ,A,Π] ≈
EXEC[Z ,S , PF ].
Quantum UC-secure protocols also admit general composition:
Theorem A.4 (Quantum UC Composition Theorem [Unr10, Theorem 11]). Let Π,Π′ and Σ be
quantum-polynomial-time protocols. Assume that Π quantum UC-emulates Π′. Then ΣΠ quantum
UC-emulates ΣΠ
′
.
Remark A.5. Out of the two protocol parties (the sender and the receiver), we consider security only in the
case of the receiver being a corrupted party. Note that we are only interested in cases where the same party is
corrupted with respect to all composed protocol. Furthermore, we only consider static corruption.
B Stand-Alone Security in the case of a Malicious Sender
Here, we recall notation that is used in the analysis of two-party quantum protocol [DNS10].
Definition B.1. An n-step quantum two-party protocol with oracle calls, denoted ΠO = (A ,B,O, n)
consists of:
1. input space A0 and B0 for parties A andB respectively.
2. memory spaces A1, . . .An and B1, . . .Bn for A andB, respectively.
3. An n-tuple of quantum operations (A1, . . .An) for A , Ai : L(Ai−1) 7→ L(Ai), (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
4. An n-tuple of quantum operations (B1, . . .Bn) forB,Bi : L(Bi−1) 7→ L(Bi), (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
5. Memory spaces A1, . . . ,An and B1, . . . ,Bn can be written as Ai = AiO ⊗Ai ′ and Bi = BiO ⊗Bi ′,
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and O = (O1, . . . ,On) is an n-tuple of quantum operations: Oi : L(AOi ⊗ BOi ) 7→
L(AOi ⊗BOi ), (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
If ΠO = (A ,B,O, n) is an n-turn two-party protocol, then the final state of the interaction
upon input ρin ∈ D(A0 ⊗B0 ⊗R) whereR is a system of dimension dimA0 dimB0, is:
[A ©∗ B](ρin) = (1L(A′n⊗B′n⊗R)⊗On)(An⊗Bn⊗ 1R) . . . (1L(A′1⊗B′1⊗R)⊗O1)(A1⊗B1⊗ 1R)(ρin) .
(13)
As in [DNS10], we specify that an oracle O can be a communication oracle or an ideal function-
ality oracle.
An adversary ˜A for an honest partyA inΠO = (A ,B,O, n) is an n-tuple of quantum operations
matching the input and outputs spaces ofA . A simulator for ˜A is a sequence of quantum operations
(Si)ni=1 where Si has the same input-output spaces as the maps of ˜A at step i. In addition, S has
access to the ideal functionality for the protocol Π.
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C Security Analysis for the Token
We now provide the technical result (Theorem 3.4) that is used to prove security of our Quantum
OTM construction of Section 3.1 against a linear number of queries. The statement below is
informal; to make it formal, in Section C.3 we model the user’s interaction with the token via
the Gutoski-Watrous framework for quantum games [GW07]. The resulting formal statement we
desire, which immediately yields the informal claim below, is given in Theorem C.3.
Theorem C.1 (Informal). For any stateless hardware token implemented as in Program 1, i.e., using an
n-qubit conjugate coding state |x〉θ , and for any user of the token (restricted only by the laws of quantum
mechanics, meaning using any trace-preserving completely positive maps desired, regardless of efficiency of
their implementation) making m queries to the token, the probability the user successfully queries the token
to extract both secret bits s0 and s1 is at most O(22m−0.228n).
Thus, we are able to prove that if the user makes at most m = cn queries with c < 0.114, then the
user’s probability of cheating successfully is exponentially small in n.
The next sections show this claim, and are organized as follows. Sections C.1 and C.2 introduce
notation, terminology, semidefinite programming, and the Gutoski-Watrous quantum games
framework. Section C.3 shows the formal version of the claim above, namely Theorem C.3.
C.1 Notation, quantum channels, and semidefinite programming
Notation. Let X be a finite dimensional complex Hilbert space. Then, L(X ), Herm(X ), Pos(X ),
and D(X ) denote the sets of linear, Hermitian, positive semidefinite, and density operators acting
on X , respectively. The notation A  B means A− B is positive semidefinite.
Quantum channels. A linear map Φ : L(X ) 7→ L(Y) is a quantum channel if Φ is trace-preserving
and completely positive (TPCP). These are the channels which map density operators to density
operators. Although we will not directly make use of it here (the Gutoski-Watrous framework
in Section C.2 will use the concept indirectly in our presentation), a useful representation of
linear maps (or “superoperators”) Φ : L(X ) 7→ L(Y) is the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation,
J(Φ) ∈ L(Y ⊗X ). The latter is defined (with respect to some choice of orthonormal basis {|i〉} for
X ) as
J(Φ) =∑
i,j
Φ(|i〉〈j|)⊗ |i〉〈j|. (14)
The following properties of J(Φ) hold [Cho75, Jam72]: (1) Φ is completely positive if and only
if J(Φ)  0, and (2) Φ is trace-preserving if and only if TrY (J(Φ)) = IX . In a nutshell, the
Gutoski-Watrous framework generalizes this definition to interacting strategies [GW07].
Semidefinite programs. We give a brief overview of semidefinite programs (SDPs) from the
perspective of quantum information, as done e.g., in the notes of Watrous [Wat11] or [MVW13]. For
further details, a standard text on convex optimization is Boyd and Vandenberghe [BV04].
Given any 3-tuple (A, B,Φ) for operators A ∈ Herm(X ) and B ∈ Herm(Y), and linear map
Φ : L(X ) 7→ L(Y) mapping Hermitian operators to Hermitian operators, one can state a primal
and dual semidefinite program:
19
Primal problem (P)
sup Tr(AX)
s.t. Φ(X) = B,
X ∈ Pos(X ),
Dual problem (D)
inf Tr(BY)
s.t. Φ∗(Y)  A
Y ∈ Herm(Y),
whereΦ∗ denotes the adjoint ofΦ, which is the unique map satisfying Tr(A†Φ(B)) = Tr((Φ∗(A))†B)
for all A ∈ L(Y) and B ∈ L(X ). Not all SDPs have feasible solutions (i.e. a solution satisfying all
constraints); in this case, we label the optimal values as −∞ for P and ∞ for D, respectively. Note
also that the SDP we derive in Equation (21) will for simplicity not be written in precisely the form
above, but can without loss of generality be made so.
C.2 The Gutoski-Watrous framework for quantum games
We now recall the Gutoski-Watrous (GW) framework for quantum games [GW07], which can be
used to model quantum interactions between spatially separated parties. The setup most relevant
to our protocol here is depicted in Figure C.2. Here, we imagine one party, A, prepares an initial
ρ0
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Figure 2: A general interaction between two quantum parties.
state ρ0 ∈ D(X1⊗W0). Register X1 is then sent to the second party (W0 is kept as private memory),
B, who applies some quantum channel Φi : L(X1) 7→ L(Y1 ⊗Z1). B keeps register Z1 as private
memory, and sends Y1 back to A, who applies channel Ψ1 : L(W0 ⊗ Y1) 7→ L(X2 ⊗W1), and
sends X2 to B. The protocol continues for m messages back and forth, until the final operation
Ψm : L(Wm ⊗Ym) 7→ C, in which A performs a two-outcome measurement (specifically, a POVM
P = {P0, P1}, meaning P0, P1  0, P0 + P1 = I) in order to decide whether to reject (P0) or accept
(P1). As done in [GW07], we may assume without loss of generality6 that all channels are given
by linear isometries Ak, i.e. Φk(X) = AkXA†k . (A linear isometry A ∈ L(S , T ) satisfies A† A = IS .
Such maps are roughly generalizations of unitary maps to non-square matrices.) Reference [GW07]
refers to (Φ1, . . . ,Φm) as a strategy and (ρ0,Ψ1, . . . ,Ψm) as a co-strategy. In our setting, the former is
“non-measuring”, meaning it makes no final measurement after Φm is applied, whereas the latter is
“measuring”, since we will apply a final measurement on spaceWm (not depicted in Figure C.2).
The GW framework then gives the Choi-Jamiołkowski (CJ) representation of a strategy and
(measuring) co-strategy as follows. (Recall the definition of the Choi-Jamiołkowski representation for
superoperators is given in Section C.1, but the relationship between that definition and the more
generalized development below for strategies/co-strategies is not a priori obvious.)
6This is due to the Stinespring dilation theorem.
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CJ representation of (non-measuring) strategy. The CJ representation is given by
TrZm(vec(A) vec(A)
†), (15)
where A ∈ L(X1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xm,Y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ym ⊗Zm) is defined as the product of the isometries Ai,
A := (IY1⊗···⊗Ym−1 ⊗ Am) · · · (A1 ⊗ IX2⊗···⊗Xm), (16)
and the vec : L(S , T ) 7→ T ⊗ S mapping is the linear extension of the map |i〉〈j| 7→ |i〉|j〉 defined
on all standard basis states |i〉, |j〉.
CJ representation of (measuring) co-strategy. Let P := {P0, P1} denote a POVM with reject and
accept measurement operators P0 and P1, respectively. A measuring strategy which ends with a
measurement with respect to POVM P replaces, for Pa ∈ P, Equation (15) with
Qa := TrZm((Pa ⊗ IY1⊗···⊗Ym) vec(A) vec(A)†)
= TrZm(vec((
√
Pa ⊗ IY1⊗···⊗Ym)A) vec((
√
Pa ⊗ IY1⊗···⊗Ym)A)†)
=: TrZm(vec(Ba) vec(Ba)
†). (17)
To convert this to a co-strategy, one takes the transpose of the operators defined above (with respect
to the standard basis). (Note: In our use of the GW framework in Section C.3, all operators we
derive will be symmetric with respect to the standard basis, and hence taking this transpose will be
unnecessary.)
Optimization characterization over strategies and co-strategies. Fix any Qa from a measuring
co-strategy {Q0, Q1}, as in Equation (17). Then, the maximum probability with which a (non-
measuring) strategy can force the co-strategy to output result a is given by
min: p (18)
subject to: Qa  pRm
Rk = Pk ⊗ IYk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m
TrXk(Pk) = Rk−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m
R0 = 1
Rk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m
Pk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k−1 ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m
p ∈ [0, 1]
C.3 Security against a linear number of token queries
To show security of our hardware token implementation (Program 1) against a linear number of
queries, we now model a user’s interaction with the token as an interactive game between two
parties using the GW framework of Section C.2. We shall treat the token as the co-strategy and the
user as the strategy.
We proceed as follows. As depicted in Figure C.2, the token (co-strategy) begins by preparing
state ρ0 ∈ L(X1 ⊗W0), and sending message X1 to the user. The user then makes m queries, each
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via a distinct register Yi for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. For each query made, we model the token as returning
two strings: (1) a symbol in set Σ =
{
0, 1, 0, 1
}
where 0 and 1 denote successful 0- and 1-queries,
respectively, and 0 and 1 denote unsuccessful 0- and 1-queries, respectively, and (2) a bit b which is
set to 0 for a failed query, or secret bit bi for a successful i-query. Formally, the size of each register
Xi for i ≥ 2 is hence three qubits. We will deviate from Figure C.2 in one respect — we assume the
token returns the response to query m as well via a register Ym+1; this does not affect the success or
failure of the user (as the latter makes no further queries at this point), but helps streamline the
analysis. After this last response is sent out, the token measures the string s ∈ Σm of responses it
sent back to the user, and “accepts” if and only if s contains at least one 0 and one 1. (More on this
history of responses kept by the token and how to maintain the stateless property of the token to
come.)
Let us next introduce the terminology used in this section for discussing the secret key held
by the token. Namely, recall in Program 1 that the token keeps secret key data x ∈ {0, 1}n and
θ ∈ {+,×}n. Here, we shall replace these by a single string z ∈ {0, 1}2n, such that bits 2i and 2i + 1
of z specify the basis and value of conjugate coding qubit i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (i.e. z2i = θi and
z2i+1 = xi). We shall call z the secret key. For consistency, we shall rename the quantum key |x〉θ from
Program 1 by |ψz〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n, i.e. |x〉θ = |ψz〉. Next, in Program 1 the token takes inputs b ∈ {0, 1}
and y ∈ {0, 1}n, for b the choice bit and y the claimed measured value. In this section, we shall
simply concatenate these as one string x = by ∈ {0, 1}n+1, the first bit of which is the choice bit.
We shall refer to x as a query string. With these definitions in hand, for each secret key z ∈ {0, 1}2n,
we define a partition A0(z), A1(z), A0(z), A1(z) of {0, 1}n+1, which correspond to the sets of query
strings x which cause the token to return response 0, 1, 0, or 1, respectively.
We can now begin to set up the GW framework. To define linear isometries Ak, we first construct
operators ∆k(z) : Yk 7→ Xk+1 ⊗Wk,k+1 for k ∈ {1, . . . , m} as follows:
∆k(z) = ∑
x∈A0(z)
|00〉Xk+1 |x0〉Wk,k+1〈x|Yk +
∑
x∈A1(z)
|10〉Xk+1 |x1〉Wk,k+1〈x|Yk +
∑
x∈A0(z)
|0b0〉Xk+1 |x0〉Wk,k+1〈x|Yk +
∑
x∈A1(z)
|1b1〉Xk+1 |x1〉Wk,k+1〈x|Yk .
Above, recall the register Yk denotes the kth message sent by the user to the token, Xk the kth
response sent by the token back to the user (the first symbol of which denotes accept/reject via a
symbol from Σ, and the second symbol of which is the corresponding secret bit, which is set to 0 by
default for failed queries), andWk denotes the private memory of the token, which we now discuss
further.
Let us now elaborate on how the token’s private memory spacesWk is modelled. First, W0
contains the secret key z ∈ {0, 1}2n of the token. Then, eachWk register for k > 0 is split into k + 1
parts: Wk,1 contains a copy of z (this allows us to pass forward z from one round of interaction
to the next), andWk,r for r ≥ 2 contains a copy in the standard basis of the user’s (r− 1)st query
string, as well as the token’s response from Σ. These copies are kept for two reasons. First, it
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simulates measuring each message from the user in the standard basis7, as required by the token.
Second, keeping x ensures ∆k(z)†∆k(z) = I, so that each Ai defined shortly is an isometry. Note
that, crucially, the contents ofWk,r for r ≥ 2 are never accessed again8 by the token in any future
iteration (this is the definition of the token being stateless, and is formally captured by the definition
of the terms Ai shortly). Also, while the size of W grows with m in our security analysis here,
the actual token does not have growing memory requirements since it simply discards the results
of each measurement of the user’s message once it returns a symbol from Σ in each round of
communication.
We can now define isometries Ai (intuition to follow) for round i of the token’s actions, where
1 < k ≤ m:
A0 =
1
2n ∑
z∈{0,1}2n
|ψz〉X1 |z〉W0,1
A1 = ∑
z∈{0,1}2n
∆1(z)Y1,X2,W1,2 ⊗ |z〉W1,1〈z|W0,1
Ak = ∑
z∈{0,1}2n
∆k(z)Yk ,Xk+1,Wk,k+1 ⊗ |z〉Wk,1〈z|Wk−1,1
k⊗
r=2
IWk,r ,Wk−1,r
Here, A0 : C 7→ X1 ⊗W0, and Ak : Yk ⊗Wk−1 7→ Xk+1 ⊗Wk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Intuitively, the
isometry A0 captures the token choosing an initial secret key z uniformly at random and preparing
corresponding quantum key |ψz〉, which it sends to the user. Each Ai for 1 ≤ k ≤ m captures the
token reading a message from the user in Yk and measuring it in the standard basis (simulated by
copying string x to a private registerWk,k+1), and returning an appropriate response to the user in
register Xk+1 (note this response depends only on the contents of Yk, i.e., on the kth message, since
the token is stateless). It also stores a copy of the kth response from Σ to the user in the private
registerWk,k+1; as mentioned before, this information is not accessed by the token in deciding any
future messages Xk+i, but is used in our analysis to define the accepting measurement P1.
Having defined isometries Ai, their product now yields operator A from Equation (16) (where
we reorder the X andW registers to clarify that incoming message Yk results in outgoing message
Xk+1):
A =
1
2n ∑
z∈{0,1}2n
∑
x1,...,xm∈{0,1}n+1
|x1A(x1, z)〉Wm,2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xm A(xm, z)〉Wm,m+1 ⊗
|A(xm, z)bA(xm,z)〉Xm+1〈xm|Ym ⊗ |A(xm−1, z)bA(xm−1,z)〉Xm〈xm−1|Ym−1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
|A(x1, z)bA(x1,z)〉X2〈x1|Y1 ⊗ |ψz〉X1 ⊗ |z〉Wm,1 ,
7Normally, the GW framework allows quantum messages to be exchanged between parties, but in our setting the
token only accepts classical query strings. To force the user to send classical strings, the token can simulate measurement
of the user’s query qubits by simply creating a “local copy” of said qubits via local controlled-NOT gates, i.e. the token
employs the principle of deferred measurement.
8Strictly speaking, as mentioned earlier, this is not quite accurate — the contents ofWk,r are accessed during the
final measurement made by the token in determining whether the user succeeded in cheating. This, however, is just a
technical construct for our analysis, which allows us to formalize what it means for the user to “successfully cheat”. The
final measurement does not affect any of the token’s previous responses Xi, thus maintaining the stateless property of
the token. For clarity, in the actual protocol itself, the token does not keep any private memory, and makes no “final”
measurement as done in our analysis.
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where A(x, z) ∈ Σ denotes whether the token accepted or rejected query string x assuming secret
key z, and bA(x,z) ∈ {0, 1} is the secret bit returned by the token corresponding to A(x, z) ∈ Σ.
In order to next define operator Q1 from Equation (17), we model what it means for a cheating
user of the token to “succeed”. As mentioned earlier, this is formalized by having the token make
a final measurement after the protocol concludes, in order to determine whether the user has
successfully extracted both secret bits via queries. Formally, for convenience, letW ′ denote the
tensor product of the registers inWm,r for 2 ≤ r ≤ m + 1 which hold the values from Σ (i.e., which
hold terms A(xr−1, z)). Then, a successful user makes at least one correct 0 query and at least one
correct 1 query. Our accepting measurement operator P1, which corresponds to a successful user, is
thus defined as follows. P1 mapsW ′ to itself, and is a projector onto the set of strings with some
i 6= j such thatW ′i is set to |0〉 andW ′j is set to |1〉. In other words, P1 projects onto set
S := {s ∈ Σm | s contains at least one 0 and one 1}. (19)
To now use this definition of P1 to write down B1, we first need further terminology. Define for any
s ∈ S and fixed key z ∈ {0, 1}2n, the set of all consistent sequences of query strings xi ∈ {0, 1}n+1
as:
Xs =
{
(x, z) ∈ {0, 1}m(n+1) × {0, 1}2n | A(xi, z) = si for xi the ith block of (n + 1) bits in x
}
.
(For clarity and as an example, the second block of (n + 1) bits of 0n+11n+1 is 1n+1.) Finally, define
relation R ⊆ Σm × {0, 1}m(n+1) × {0, 1}2n such that
(s, x, z) ∈ R if and only if (x, z) ∈ Xs.
In words, a triple (s, x, z) ∈ R if for a secret key z and query string x, s ∈ Σm is the (unique) correct
response string from the token.
With these definitions in place, we can finally define B1 = (
√
P1 ⊗ I)A = (P1 ⊗ I)A as (where
recall si = A(xi, z))
B1 =
1
2n ∑
(s,x,z)∈R
|x1s1〉Wm,2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xmsm〉Wm,m+1 ⊗
|smbsm〉Xm+1〈xm|Ym ⊗ |sm−1bsm−1〉Xm〈xm−1|Ym−1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s1bs1〉X2〈x1|Y1 ⊗
|ψz〉X1 ⊗ |z〉Wm,1 .
Thus,
vec(B1) =
1
2n ∑
(s,x,z)∈R
|x1s1〉Wm,2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xmsm〉Wm,m+1 ⊗
|smbsm〉Xm+1 |xm〉Ym ⊗ |sm−1bsm−1〉Xm |xm−1〉Ym−1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s1bs1〉X2 |x1〉Y1 ⊗
|z〉Wm,1 ⊗ |ψz〉X1 .
It follows that Q1 = TrWm(vec(B1) vec(B1)∗) equals
Q1 =
1
22n ∑
(s,x,z)∈R
|smbsm〉〈smbsm |Xm+1 ⊗ |xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗
|s1bs1〉〈s1bs1 |X2 ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1 ⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1 .
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Above, note that we have crucially used the fact that queries to the token are classical strings;
this allows us to reduce Q1 to a mixture over (s, x, z) ∈ R (i.e., all cross-terms in vec(B1) vec(B1)∗
disappear once we trace outWm).
Permuting subsystems, we can hence write:
Q1 =
1
4n ∑s∈S
|smbsm〉〈smbsm |Xm+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s1bs1〉〈s1bs1 |X2 ⊗(
∑
(x,z)∈Xs
|xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1 ⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1
)
. (20)
Having set up all required operators for the GW framework, Equation (18) of Section C.2 now yields
the optimal probability with which a cheating user can succeed; we reproduce Equation (18) below
for ease of exposition. Note the subsystem ordering of Q1 below is not that of Equation (20), but
rather Q1 ∈ Pos(Y1,...,m ⊗X1,...,m+1) below; we have omitted explicitly including the permutation
effecting this reordering to avoid clutter. Also, to account for the slight asymmetry in our protocol
(the token sends out m + 1 messages Xi, whereas the user only sends m messages Yi), we add a
dummy space Ym+1 = Cwhich models an empty (m + 1)st message from the user to the token.
min: p
subject to: Q1  pRm+1
Rk = Pk ⊗ IYk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
TrXk(Pk) = Rk−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
R0 = 1
Rk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
Pk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k−1 ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
p ∈ [0, 1]
While this optimization is not an SDP due to the quadratic constraint Q1  pRm+1, it is easily seen
to be equivalent9 to the following SDP Γ:
min: p (21)
subject to: Q1  Rm+1
Rk = Pk ⊗ IYk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
TrXk(Pk) = Rk−1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
R0 = p
Rk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
Pk ∈ Pos(Y1,...,k−1 ⊗X1,...,k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ m + 1
Note we have dropped the constraint p ∈ [0, 1]; this is redundant, as we now show. Henceforth,
for brevity we shall use terminology T1···k to denote the space T1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Tk.
Lemma C.2. The SDP Γ has a feasible solution with p = 1.
9We thank Jamie Sikora for sharing this observation with us.
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Proof. Recall from Equation (20) that
Q1 =
1
4n ∑
(s,x,z)∈R
|s, b〉〈s, b|Xm+1···2 ⊗
(
|xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1
)
⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1 ,
where s ⊆ Σm and b ∈ {0, 1}m are the resulting query responses and secret bits, respectively.
Observe that any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}m(n+1) and z ∈ {0, 1}2n determine a unique query response string
s ∈ Σm; denote this as s(x, z). Therefore,
Q1 =
1
4n ∑x,z
s.t. s(x,z)∈S
|s(x, z), b〉〈s(x, z), b|Xm+1···2 ⊗
(
|xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1
)
⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1 ,
for S ⊆ Σm defined as in Equation (19). Let us drop the constraint that s(x, z) ∈ S, i.e. choose
Rm+1 =
1
4n ∑x,z
|s(x, z), b〉〈s(x, z), b|Xm+1···2 ⊗
(
|xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1
)
⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1 .
Clearly, Q1  p · Rm+1 for p = 1, since we added positive semidefinite terms to Q1 to get Rm+1.
Thus, if Rm+1 satisfies the remaining primal constraints, then it has objective function value p = 1.
To see that Rm+1 satisfies the primal constraints, clearly Qm+1 has I in register Ym+1 (recall
Ym+1 = C, so this just means Ym+1 is trivially set to 1). Let us now trace out Xm+1; we require that
register Ym−1 now also contains the identity. For this, TrXm+1(Rm+1) equals:
1
4n ∑xm,...,x1
∑
z
|sm−1(x, z)bm−1〉〈sm−1(x, z)bm−1|Xm···2 ⊗
(
|xm〉〈xm|Ym ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1
)
⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1 ,
where for brevity we use sm−1(x, z)bm−1 to denote the first m− 1 queries. But since we discarded
the mth symbol of s(x, z), registers Ym and X1 are now independent. Thus, bringing in the sum
over xm,
TrXm+1(Qm+1) =
1
4n ∑xm−1,...,x1
∑
z
|sm−1(x, z)bm−1〉〈sm−1(x, z)bm−1|Xm···2 ⊗(
IYm ⊗ |xm−1〉〈xm−1|Ym−1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x1〉〈x1|Y1
)
⊗ |ψz〉〈ψz|X1 .
In a similar fashion, tracing out registers Xm···2 will yield operator
1
4n
IYm+1···1 ⊗∑
z
|ψz〉〈ψz|X1 .
Finally, tracing out X1 yields IYm···1 , since there are 4n possible quantum key states |ψz〉. Hence,
Rm+1 is a feasible solution.
An upper bound on the cheating probability. We now give a feasible solution to SDP Γ which
yields the claimed security against a linear number of queries. Its proof of correctness relies on
Lemma C.4, stated and proven subsequently.
Theorem C.3. The SDP Γ has a feasible solution with p ∈ O(22m−0.228n).
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Proof. As Q1 in Equation (20) is block-diagonal in registers X2, . . . ,Xm+1, consider solution (for S
from Equation (19))
Rm+1 =
1
|S| ∑s∈S
|smbsm〉〈smbsm |Xm+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s1bs1〉〈s1bs1 |X2 ⊗ IY1,...,m ⊗
I
2n X1
.
(Aside: Recall that X1 is an n-qubit register above, hence the 2n renormalization factor.) Note that
|Σm| = 4m
{s ∈ Σm | s does not contain a 0} = 3m
{s ∈ Σm | s does not contain a 1} = 3m
{s ∈ Σm | s does not contain a 0 or a 1} = 2m.
Thus, by the inclusion-exclusion principle, |S| = 4m − 2 · 3m + 2m.
In order for Rm+1 to be feasible, we must pick p such that Q1  pRm+1 (recall this is equivalent
to the SDP formulation Γ). Since Q1 is block-diagonal on registers X2 · · · Xm+1, it suffices to identify
its block with the largest eigenvalue. In fact, each corresponding block for Rm+1 has eigenvalue
(|S| 2n)−1. Thus, we must choose p such that
λmax(Q1) ≤ p|S| 2n ,
or equivalently, due to the 4−n factor in Q1,
p ≥ |S|
2n
λmax (4nQ1) .
By Lemma C.4, λmax(Q1) = 24n
(
1+ 1√
2
)n
. Thus, we can set
p =
|S|
2n−1
(
1+
1√
2
)n
≈ |S| · 2(−0.228)n+1,
and since |S| ∈ Θ(4m), the cheating probability satisfies p ∈ O(22m−0.228n).
Lemma C.4. For Q1 in Equation (20), λmax(Q1) = 24n
(
1+ 1√
2
)n
.
Proof. The factor of 4−n in the claimed value for λmax(Q1) comes from the 4−n appearing in
Equation (20); we henceforth thus ignore this 4−n term in this proof by redefining Q1 as 4nQ1.
We shall also ignore the bi terms in Q1, as they shall play no role in the analysis. Now, since
Q1 is block-diagonal (with respect to the standard basis) on registers X2,. . . ,Xm+1, Y1,. . . ,Ym, it
suffices to characterize the largest eigenvalue of any block. We shall say that any fixed s ∈ S
and x ∈ {0, 1}m(n+1) defines the (s, x)-block of Q1. (Formally, the (s, x)-block of Q1 is given by
Πs,xQ1Πs,x, where Πs,x = |s〉〈s|Xm+1···2 ⊗ |x〉〈x|Y .)
We begin by demonstrating an explicit s, x such that the (s, x)-block has eigenvalue 24n (1+
1√
2
)n
(i.e. λmax(Q1) ≥ 24n (1 + 1√2 )n). Set s = 0m−11 (note s ∈ S) and x = x1 . . . xm for x1 = x2 = · · · =
xm−1 and xm−1 6= xm (note xi ∈ {0, 1}n+1), where the first bit of each of x1, . . . , xm−1 is 0, and the
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first bit of xm is 1. In words, we are modelling m− 1 successful (and identical) 0-queries in the
Z-basis, followed by a single successful 1-query in the X-basis. The question now is: Given s and x,
how many |ψz〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n exist such that (s, x, z) ∈ R?
To answer this, observe that the token enforces the following set of rules. Fix any i ∈ {1, . . . , m},
and let |xi(j)〉 and |ψz(j)〉 denote the jth qubits of xi and ψz, respectively. Then we have rules
(where H denotes the 2× 2 Hadamard matrix, and b denotes the complement of bit b):
1. If si = 0, then ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either |ψz(j)〉 = |xi(j)〉 or |ψz(j)〉 ∈ {|+〉, |−〉}.
2. If si = 1, then ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either |ψz(j)〉 = H|xi(j)〉 or |ψz(j)〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉}.
3. If si = 0, then ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that |ψz(j)〉 = |xi(j)〉.
4. If si = 1, then ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that |ψz(j)〉 = H|xi(j)〉.
Recall now that we set s1 = 0 and sm = 1, i.e. the first query was a successful Z-basis query and
the last query was a successful X-basis query. Applying rules 1 and 2 above thus yields that for all
indices k, |ψz(k)〉 ∈ {|x1(k)〉, H|xm(k)〉}. Moreover, since x1 = x2 = · · · = xm−1, it follows that for
all k, both assignments for |ψz(k)〉 are consistent for |ψz(k)〉. We conclude that the (s, x)-block of
Q1 has the following operator in register X1:
σ =
m⊗
k=1
(|x1(k)〉〈x1(k)|+ H|xm(k)〉〈xm(k)|H) . (22)
But for any b, c ∈ {0, 1}, λmax(|b〉〈b|+ H|c〉〈c|H) = 1+ 1√2 (see, e.g., [MVW13]). Thus, λmax(σ) =
(1+ 1√
2
)n, as claimed.
We next show a matching upper bound of λmax(Q1) ≤ 24n (1+ 1√2 )n among all (s, x)-blocks. For
any s ∈ S, there exist indices i 6= j such that xi and xj are a successful 0- and 1-query, respectively.
Without loss of generality, assume i = j = 1. Then, as in the previous case, rules 1 and 2 imply that:
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |ψz(k)〉 ∈ {|x1(k)〉, H|xm(k)〉}. (23)
Consider now any xi for 1 < i < m, and suppose without loss of generality that xi is a 0-query,
i.e. its first bit is set to 0. There are two cases to analyze:
• (Case 1: si = 0) In this case, both query 1 and query i are successful 0-queries; thus, they
must agree on all secret key bits which were encoded in the Z basis. It follows from Rule 1
that for any bit k on which x1 and xi disagree, the secret key must have encoded bit k in the
X-basis. In other words, |ψz(k)〉 = H|xm(k)〉 in Equation (23) (i.e. one of the two possibilities
is eliminated). (If x1 = xi, on the other hand, no such additional constraint exists.)
• (Case 2: si = 0) In this case, query i is an unsuccessful 0-query. By Rule 3, there exists a bit k
on which x1 and xk disagree, and whose corresponding secret key bit was encoded in the Z
basis. In other words, |ψz(k)〉 = |x1(k)〉 in Equation (23) (i.e., one of the two possibilities is
eliminated).
The analysis for xi being a 1-query is analogous. We conclude that for any (s, x)-block of Q1,
the operator in register X1 is of the form of σ from Equation (22), except that the some of the
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indices k may contain an operator consisting of only 1 summand (e.g. |x1(k)〉〈x1(k)| instead of
|x1(k)〉〈x1(k)|+ H|xm(k)〉〈xm(k)|H). Since the omitted summands are all positive semidefinite,
however, we conclude the eigenvalue on any (s, x)-block is at most the eigenvalue of σ from
Equation (22), i.e., at most λmax(Q1) ≤ 24n (1+ 1√2 )n, as claimed.
D Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof. Observe first that an honest receiver Alice wishing to extract si acts as follows. She applies a
unitary Ui ∈ U (A⊗ B) to get state
|φ1〉 := Ui|ψ〉AB|0〉C. (24)
She then measures B in the computational basis and postselects on result y ∈ {0, 1}n, obtaining
state
|φ2〉 := |φy〉A|y〉B|0〉C. (25)
She now treats y as a “key” for si, i.e., she applies O f to B⊗ C to obtain her desired bit si, i.e.,
|φ3〉 := |φy〉A|y〉B|si〉C. (26)
A malicious receiver Bob wishing to extract s0 and s1 now acts similarly to the rewinding
strategy for superposition queries. Suppose without loss of generality that s0 has at most ∆ keys.
Then, Bob first applies U0 to prepare |φ1〉 from Equation (24), which we can express as
|φ1〉 = ∑
y∈{0,1}n
αy|ψy〉A|y〉B|0〉C. (27)
for ∑y
∣∣αy∣∣2 = 1. Since measuring B next would allow us to retrieve s0 in register C with certainty,
we have that all y appearing in the expansion above satisfy f (y) = si. Moreover, since s0 has at
most ∆ keys, there exists a key y′ such that
∣∣αy′ ∣∣2 ≥ 1/∆. Bob now measures B in the computational
basis to obtain |φ2〉 from Equation (25), obtaining y′ with probability at least 1/∆. Feeding y′ into
O f yields s1. Having obtained y′, we have that |〈φ1|φ2〉|2 ≥ 1/∆, implying∣∣∣〈ψ|U†0 |φy′〉|y′〉∣∣∣2 ≥ 1/∆, (28)
i.e., Bob now applies U†0 to recover a state with “large” overlap with initial state |ψ〉.
To next recover s1, define |ψgood〉 := U1|ψ〉 and |ψapprox〉 := U1U†0 |φy′〉|y′〉. Bob applies U1 to
obtain
|ψapprox〉 = β1|ψgood〉+ β2|ψ⊥good〉, (29)
where ∑i |βi|2 = 1, 〈ψgood|ψ⊥good〉 = 0, and |β1|2 ≥ 1/∆. Define Πgood := ∑y∈{0,1}n s.t. f (y)=s1 |y〉〈y|.
Then, the probability that measuring B in the computational basis now yields a valid key for s1 is
〈ψapprox|Πgood|ψapprox〉 ≥ |β1|2 ≥ 1∆ , (30)
where we have used the fact that Πgood|ψgood〉 = |ψgood〉 (since an honest receiver can extract s1
with certainty). We conclude that Bob can extract both s0 and s1 with probability at least 1/∆2.
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